In presidential systems, presidents are typically both heads of government and heads of state. In parliamentary systems, however, the latter is seen as a separate function carried out by a noble figurehead for the country and its citizens. Indeed, in many cases, presidents who coexist with prime ministers are seen as little more than monarchs in constitutional monarchies. They are typically experienced and established pubic figures, standing above daily politics and committed to more elevated tasks. These include symbolic functions such as embodiment of national unity, ceremonial tasks such as presiding over major state occasions and signing laws, and diplomatic functions such as conducting official state visits and receiving similar ones from other states.
As Table 1 .1 in the previous chapter indicated, since World War II, there have been 58 parliamentary democracies across the world where prime ministers and presidents have coexisted for at least some time. Some of these presidents are directly elected and such cases are often classified as a separate regime type-semi-presidential democracies (Duverger 1980; Elgie 1999a; Samuels and Shugart 2006; Sartori 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992) . Even if in some cases the definition of semipresidentialism also includes other criteria, such as presidential powers, direct elections are still often considered a necessary criterion. Following this tradition, whenever using the term "semi-presidential," I refer to only the pool of countries with directly elected presidents. A generic concept referring to all relevant cases is "parliamentary system with a president."
The presidents that coexist with prime ministers in parliamentary systems all perform the above-mentioned ceremonial tasks. However, to assume that they represent the limits of their role is a serious mistake. Indeed, all presidents possess additional clearly defined powers in the governing process. Presidents can have legislative powers such as the right to veto or delay legislation, propose legislation, or issue decrees. They can also have non-legislative powers including a function in the process of government formation and/or dismissal. Additionally, most constitutions give presidents the role of the commander-in-chief of armed forces and certain prerogatives in foreign relations.
The description of specific powers can become very detailed and contain several specific functions. Consider, for example, the president of the Czech Republic. According to the constitution, the president receives foreign visitors, represents the state abroad, and is also the commander-inchief. The president names the prime minister and, on the suggestion of the latter, the cabinet. He or she appoints the judges of the Constitutional Court, chair and deputy chair of the Supreme Court, the president and the vice president of the Supreme Control Office, and members of the council of the National Bank, although many of these appointments require consent of other political actors. The president can convene the lower house of the parliament, and dissolve it under certain circumstances. He or she has the right to veto legislation, which the lower house can readopt with a simple majority. The president can participate and speak in the meetings of parliament and government.
Most other presidents share the general powers of the Czech presidents listed above, although the specific details of powers vary considerably across constitutions. Several authors have tried to systematize these constitutional provisions into presidential power indexes, based on some broad categories of legislative and non-legislative powers that would allow cross-country comparisons (Baylis 1996; Frye 1997; Metcalf 2000; Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003) . I will describe these in more detail below. Let it suffice to state here that even the least powerful presidents score above zero on most of these indexes, indicating that they all possess powers beyond the ceremonial level. Given that these powers exist, understanding whether, when, and how presidents choose to use them is an intriguing puzzle to policymakers.
Presidential Activism and Its Possible Negative Consequences
Presidential activism can take several different forms. Most commonly, it is understood as intense use of presidential discretionary powers. These vary by constitution, but the main target areas of presidential influence include approving or vetoing legislation (Protsyk 2005b) , engaging in policy discussions with the executive or foreign leaders (Müller 1999) , or interfering with cabinet-building (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2005) . The constitutional provisions designating authority to the head of state usually leave room for interpretation. Presidents can then try to exercise discretionary power in situations not explicitly regulated by law (Baylis 1996; Protsyk 2006) . For example, quite a large number of constitutions provide that the president is the "commander-in-chief" or the "supreme commander" of the armed forces. In reality, the actual powers over the military may differ significantly between the presidents of different countries according to the way officeholders have chosen to interpret them (Gallagher 1999, 109; Müller 1999, 35) . The events surrounding the 2005 early parliamentary election in Germany offer another example of constitutional ambiguity: It was not clear whether the president had the right to call early elections, and it is quite possible that a different officeholder might not have acquiesced to the wishes of Chancellor Schröder. Different presidents choose to exercise similar discretionary powers more frequently and thereby may be more active.
In addition to making use of formal powers, presidents can also exercise activism through their informal capacity to affect politics and policy. Given their high status in society, they can exercise influence by making statements and taking sides. Even without legislative powers, presidents can draw attention to certain problems in society and thereby set the policy agenda. Because of their high visibility at home and abroad, presidents may be able to influence domestic public opinion and also international impressions of the country.
Both the active use of constitutional powers and informal influence may significantly alter the dynamics of policymaking. It is this concern that makes studying the causes of activism especially crucial. Constitutional debates often center on the danger of increased conflict between the president and government, along with the potential for authoritarian tendencies (see Simon 2006a; Toomla 2002; and the country studies in Elgie 1999a and Taras 1997). Veto powers allow presidents to cause delay and deadlock in policymaking. Presidents can also interrupt policy processes by initiating policies that are discordant with the government's agenda, or simply by issuing statements contradicting official government policy positions. They can obstruct or delay cabinet formation, which obviously delays policymaking. Almost universally accepted is the belief that multiple actors with different agendas are detrimental to some policy fields. Classic examples of these include foreign and military policyareas where a country is expected to act with one voice, and incidentally, also the areas where constitutions usually give presidents some notable authority. An active president in discord with the government can cause significant damage to the government's program and reputation.
In policy debates, presidential activism is almost invariably associated with such negative consequences. Furthermore, the concern over activism enters the debate only in relation to directly elected presidents. Both of these biases are also present in the existing literature on regime types from which policy debates derive most of their arguments. In this literature, directly elected presidents are treated as additional institutional veto players (Tsebelis 2002). The presence of such a veto player is automatically assumed to translate into a president's actual use of a veto, or in more general terms, into activism, which in turn leads to conflict between branches and inefficiencies in governing. Systems with directly elected presidents are thus, almost by definition, prone to more institutional conflict. The presence of a president who is not directly elected, on the other hand, is treated as equal to no president at all. Activism in such systems is thereby assumed away-it becomes a nonissue.
Consider the scholarly literature on presidentialism versus parliamentarism. Here the primary focus is on political conflict between branches and the resulting effects on stability and regime survival (Cheibub 2007; Elster 1997; Lijphart 1992; Linz 1997; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992; Stepan and Skach 1993; Taras 1997) . Presidential systems, given the additional veto player compared to parliamentary systems, allegedly increase the likelihood of deadlock and conflict, which then threatens political stability and the efficiency of governing. The primary reason for the hypothesized inefficiency is the dual legitimacy present in presidential systems and the absence of a democratic mechanism to resolve disagreements between the executive and the legislature over who represents the will of the people (Frye 1997; Linz 1990) . Additional factors, such as the autonomy of presidents (derived from direct elections), their fixed (and usually limited) number of terms in office, and their noncollegial nature exacerbate the negative effects of dual legitimacy on performance and threaten regime survival (Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1993; Stepan and Skach 1993; but see Cheibub 2007 for an opposing argument).
These arguments are echoed in studies comparing semi-presidential (those with directly elected presidents) and parliamentary regimes (those with indirectly elected presidents). The two separately elected executives in semi-presidential systems also create the problem of dual legitimacy, the same focal point as the argument about the weaknesses of the presidential system (Linz 1994; Stepan and Suleiman 1995) . The difference is that the locus of potential conflict shifts from between branches to within the executive (Elgie and Moestrup 2008b). A dual executive implies the presence of an additional player in policymaking and, thus, increases the probability of policy stability and undermines efficient government. Studies of semi-presidentialism have noted a higher level of legislative deadlock and inefficiency compared to parliamentary systems with indirectly elected presidents (Baylis 1996; Elgie and Moestrup 2008a, 2007; Protsyk 2005b) .
Why should Direct Elections Matter for Presidential Activism?
Why is it, then, that a directly elected president becomes a veto player and an indirectly elected one does not? The basic assumption in the scholarly literature and real-world policy debates is that direct elections confer more power and legitimacy to the president. This direct legitimacy, that the prime minister and government in parliamentary systems lack, provides justification for presidential demands for greater involvement in policymaking (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Baylis 1996; Duverger 1980; Krouwel 2000; Metcalf 2002; Protsyk 2005b; Shugart and Carey 1992) . As Elster (1997, 226) asserts, there is an "important power difference between directly and indirectly elected presidents." Similarly, Metcalf (2002, 2) states that it is traditionally assumed, for various reasons, that directly elected presidents "are more powerful and more dangerous for democratic consolidation than those elected by the assembly." In accordance with this assumption, the introduction of popular elections for the French president in 1962 was perceived by many authors as a complete overthrow of executive powers (Bahro et al. 1998) .
Although widely accepted, this argument has hardly been tested (see also Metcalf 2002) . Furthermore, it remains theoretically rather shallow, as no clear mechanism has been elaborated for the argument. Some studies have recognized this deficiency and the authors have called for a more explicit rationale for equating legitimacy with effective power (Metcalf 2002; Siaroff 2003) . However, to date, the argument remains largely a recurring assumption rather than an elaborated theory. How does legitimacy derived from direct elections lead to more activism? Why would a directly elected president feel more compelled to interfere in policymaking than an indirectly elected one? The argument that they see a discrepancy between their mandate and their powers, and therefore try to reduce this discrepancy by extending their powers (Baylis 1996), is not satisfactory. A direct mandate is still tied to the specific constitutionally prescribed tasks of the president, rather than a guarantee for a free reign.
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It is sometimes argued that direct elections make presidents more independent of the assembly, while indirectly elected presidents crucially depend on the latter for reappointment (see Samuels and Shugart 2006) . This gives the assembly a powerful instrument for disciplining the head of state. Given that directly elected presidents are more independent, they can be more active (Elster 1997; Linz 1994) . Although never clearly articulated in the context of directly versus indirectly elected presidents in parliamentary systems, this argument echoes the logic of principal-agent theory (Lupia and McCubbins 2000; Strøm 2000) . Samuels and Shugart (2006) use this theory to understand differences in party organization and behavior across the broad regime types of parliamentarism, presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism. The logic can be applied to understand differences in the behavior of presidents as well.
According to principal-agent theory, an agent acts on behalf of the principal and is accountable to it. That is, the principal is empowered to punish or reward the agent for the latter's performance in acting on the principal's behalf. The principals of directly and indirectly elected presidents are different: indirectly elected presidents are agents of the assembly (or an electoral college) while directly elected presidents are agents of the people. One might argue that different principals cause presidents to behave differently in office. Assuming presidents desire to be reelected, if one's reappointment depends on the parliament or some other representative body, it is in the interest of the president to remain loyal to the body that elects him or her. Such a president may therefore indeed choose to be inactive and defer to the governing party. Directly elected presidents, on the other hand, are not constrained by the assembly and, consequently, there is no obvious added benefit from deferring to the governing party. Rather, activism in office may increase the president's public appeal and popularity. Furthermore, Samuels (2007, 706) argues that in presidential systems, due to the separate origin and survival of the president and the legislature, "cross-branch coordination is neither encouraged nor guaranteed, even given preference overlap between the president and his legislative majority." By analogy, one might argue a similar mechanism for the lack of coordination and hence enhanced potential for conflict within the executive (i.e., between the prime minister and president) when presidents in parliamentary systems are directly elected. Thus, direct presidential elections should inherently, regardless of other system features, increase presidential activism and intra-executive conflict. In sum, the principal-agent argument predicts that directly elected presidents are more active.
While this argument has merits, presidents in both systems enjoy relative security in office (Baylis 1996) . Most presidents are chosen for fixed terms and deposing them requires extraordinary circumstances and/or majorities. As stated above, Samuels and Shugart (2006) apply the principal-agent framework primarily to understand differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes. The difference in the origin and survival of the chief executive in a parliamentary regime compared to a presidential regime may indeed make a difference. In parliamentary systems, the legislature can remove the prime minister (the sole executive), who originates from the assembly, when deadlock occurs, while in presidential systems, the assembly has no power to remove the executive. However, in parliamentary systems with dual executive (i.e., with both a president and a prime minister), parliament has no easy tool to remove the president, whether directly or indirectly elected. There is also no tool for either of the executives to get rid of the other. This makes the principal-agent framework less applicable to understanding differences between directly and indirectly elected presidents in parliamentary system.
Furthermore, the accountability of the indirectly elected presidents to the assembly may be more elusive than it seems. The majority coalitions in parliament may shift frequently between elections, and early elections leading to changes in the composition of parliament are not uncommon. Thus, very often the assembly that puts an indirectly elected president into power is not the same assembly that decides on his or her reappointment. Moreover, to the extent that presidential candidates and incumbents in both systems depend on parties for nomination and support, they necessarily remain constrained by these ties, directly elected or not.
An alternative avenue for establishing a micro-logic for presidential activism is to turn the question around: rather than looking for the consequences of direct elections, one should look for the causes of presidential activism. Presidents are likely to be dependent on incentives and opportunities for activism, which are constrained by the institutional and political realities within which the president operates. The role of the mode of election in this context becomes much less straightforward. Indeed, these realities are present for both directly and indirectly elected presidents and can eclipse any potential effects of activism stemming from the differences in the mode of election.
Alternative Explanation: Political Opportunity Framework and Presidential Activism
Political opportunity framework can explain presidential activism. The former is here understood as structures of relationships that influence social and political behavior. More specifically, this political opportunity framework-the strength of other political institutions and the constellation of political forces in government and parliament-influences the extent to which presidents choose to interfere in executive and legislative decision-making, thereby generating political tensions and inefficiencies in governing. The explanation accounts for both the incentives and constraints of the behavior of presidents. Importantly, the explanation does not depend on the mode of electing the president, and thus serves as a rival for the commonly accepted assumption about the pivotal role of election type.
The argument is built from a simple, rather well-established, proposition. Presidents, as any political officeholders, are motivated by a desire for power and influence in accordance with their policy preferences. Unlike the principal-agent framework, which saw presidents as office-seeking, here presidents are seen as policy-seeking.
2 These policy preferences are most easily fulfilled in a noncompetitive environment with like-minded actors in policymaking positions. This proposition thus suggests that presidential activism can be viewed in terms of consensus building politics. The lower the consensus, the greater the incentive and opportunity for presidents to assert their influence, with visible and potentially negative consequences for the efficiency of governing. The theory builds on insights from studies of semi-presidentialism, which argue that the extent of consensus between the semi-president and other institutions, mostly the parliament and government, account for important differences between the nominal and actual powers of the former (Duverger 1980; Shugart and Carey 1992) . Party systems and divided government, in turn, significantly influence the extent of consensus and thereby the governability of the regime (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Linz 1994) . The theory of political opportunity framework brings these various institutional arguments under a unified framework and extends the framework to cover also indirectly elected presidents.
Why does this political opportunity framework matter? It matters because the ability of presidents to exercise activism, regardless of their incentives to do so, will depend on the boundaries of the arena in which policymaking takes place, and these boundaries are products of political opportunity framework. As the opportunity framework changes, the boundaries of the political arena will expand or contract, changing the availability of incentives and opportunities for presidents to act. That is, presidents are not free agents in pursuit of their self-interest or policy preferences. Rather, they are operating within the realities of existing institutional and partisan structures, which constrain their behavior and choices in important ways. Political opportunity framework is here understood as consisting of: (a) the constellation of partisan preferences in those institutions; and (b) the strength of other political institutions in the system, most notably the parliament and the government.
First, consider the effect of the partisan constellation of preferences. Incentives for the president to exercise activism should be greater in situations of cohabitation or divided government, in which the president and the prime minister represent different parties or coalitions (Shugart and Carey 1992) . Presidential activism may then stem from the fact that the president disagrees with the policy position of the government. Partisan opposition can also make it more difficult for prime ministers and presidents to reach tacit agreement about the ability to exercise discretionary power in situations not explicitly regulated by legislation (Protsyk 2006) . Alternatively, if the president is supported by the governing coalition, presidential activism may decrease simply because there is less reason for ideological conflict. In addition to policy activism, Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) argue that cohabitation also influences presidential activism in cabinet formation. During times of unified government, cabinet formation bargaining between the prime minister and the president is relatively easy because both prefer to appoint co-partisans. However, during cohabitation, presidents prefer their co-partisans to the ones in the prime minister's party, or favor nonpartisan ministers as a second best option. Consensual circumstances, thus, give less incentive and opportunity for the president to exercise activism simply because there is less reason to do so-presidential policy preferences are likely to correspond with those of other institutions, and are therefore more likely to be implemented. When political structures are nonconsensual, however, presidents need to assert their powers to pursue their own policy preferences. Partisan constellation thus shapes the extent to which presidents are likely to become active.
3 Duverger (1980) provides an example of Irish president O'Dalaigh, who deviated significantly from the norm of a figurehead of state otherwise common in Ireland. His unprecedented activism and conflict with the government (culminating in his resignation) was attributed to the fact that the president and the government were politically opposed to each other. Cohabitation has often characterized the relationships between presidents and prime ministers in Lithuania and Poland, and more often than not, it has led to presidents challenging the prime ministerial leadership (Urbanavicius 1999; van der Meer Krok-Paszkowska 1999). For example, President Kwasniewski's relations with the consecutive Buzek cabinets in Poland were characterized by the extensive use of presidential vetoes due to political rivalry between the two offices (Jasiewicz 1997a). Protsyk (2005a) further argued that in Lithuania, partisan differences between the prime minister and president led not only to the frequent use of veto powers but also to undermining cabinet support in parliament. In a more systematic analysis of semi-presidential systems in Eastern Europe, Protsyk (2005b) finds that relations between the president and cabinet were significantly more often characterized by intense competition when the presidential party was not represented in parliament.
The argument holds even when the conflict with other institutions is not strictly partisan in nature. Some constitutional rules may prevent the president from actively associating him-or herself with any political party after the election. In that case, reelection campaigning under a particular party may not be an option for the president. The desire and obligation of some presidents to stand above parties may also escalate activism, both in terms of policy and appointments (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006) . Nonpartisan presidents may view themselves as a counterweight to the majoritarian tendencies of cabinet governments (Shugart and Carey 1992) , and this may motivate their involvement in governing. There are several examples of serious consequences of inter-branch conflict arising when presidents identify themselves with a broader public discontent. The governments of Peter Roman in Romania, Filip Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Jan Olszewski and Waldemar Pawlak in Poland, and Vladimír Meciar in Slovakia fell due to conflicts with presidents who saw themselves as protecting broader public interests (Baylis 1996) .
Presidential activism resulting from partisan conflict may be further reinforced by the strength of other institutions in the system. Given the presidential incentive to exercise policy activism, he or she has a better opportunity to do so when other policymaking institutions are relatively weak. The strength of other institutions can be understood in terms of their internal cohesiveness. Thus, coalition governments are generally weaker than single party majority governments because the former are more diverse in preferences, making it more difficult to reach and maintain consensus. Potential disagreements and infighting within governments give presidents an opportunity to interfere in policymaking because a fragmented government is less able to counter such presidential activism (see also Lijphart 1992; Linz 1994; Sartori 1997). For example, disagreements between coalition partners have led to presidential engagement in (mostly budgetary) policymaking in Austria (Müller 1999) . Similarly, Finnish presidential activism in the domestic arena, especially in government formation, has been tied to the fragmented and unstable nature of Finnish cabinets (Arter 1999b). A lack of a strong majority also makes it easier for presidents to find allies within parliament to undermine cabinet policies (Baylis 1996). For example, Slovakia's president Kovač, who wanted Prime Minister Mečiar's resignation, was able to find support for this cause within Mečiar's own party where a group of dissatisfied MPs helped to hasten the prime minister's fall (Baylis 1996) . Similarly, in 1992, Bulgarian president Zhelev also cooperated with members of parliament to bring down the coalition government of the United Democratic Forces (UDF) and their coalition partner, the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF).
Even more than coalitions, minority governments allow presidents to become more active and to escalate conflict with the prime minister. Protsyk (2005a Protsyk ( , 2005b argues, based on his analysis of Eastern European presidents, that minority status significantly weakened the prime minister's claim of exclusive control of the executive and escalated presidents' willingness to engage in conflict, over both policy and cabinet formation. This was true even if the minority government was not ideologically opposed to the president. Minority governments simply have no clear means to override presidential vetoes or counter their activism in other spheres. The minority status of the cabinet is a sign of political weakness that presidents recognize and are likely to capitalize on. In the absence of strong and coherent majority governments, the president's ambitions for political power become more easily realized. Consider, for example, President Adamkus of Lithuania, who chose to challenge Prime Minister Paksas's leadership only after the breakup of the majority coalition backing the prime minister and the formation of a new, but this time minority, government in 2000 (Protsyk 2005b).
Fragmented and minority governments usually stem from weak and polarized assemblies, which are not able to uphold strong and decisive governments. Assembly fragmentation is also in itself beneficial for presidential activism. Specifically, an assembly majority in systems with relatively weak presidents has the power to overrule presidential vetoes and formateurs, thereby blocking opportunities for presidential activism. In the case of extreme fragmentation, such a majority is more difficult to manufacture, so presidential decisions have a greater chance to prevail. Consensus is simply more difficult when the number of actors is large. An extremely fragmented parliament faces more acutely the problem of collective action and is therefore less able to counter presidential activism. For example, Polish president Wałęsa was considerably more active in the early 1990s when the Sejm contained 30 different political groups, with the strongest controlling only 13.5 percent of the seats. Jasiewicz (1999, 138) concludes, "[a] weak parliament, unable to generate and support a stable coalition government, and vulnerable to the criticism of public opinion, would have to yield to the president." On the other hand, when assemblies contain coherent and stable majorities, presidential initiatives are easily blocked. Even the most active president is therefore constrained by the strength of the other institutions whose agreement is essential for making policy.
The argument about the importance of party systems and parliamentary constellation of preferences for presidential activism has mostly been made in the context of directly elected presidents. It is easy to understand, however, how the argument applies also to presidential activism within the pool of indirectly elected presidents. That is, depending on whether the president is from a different party than those in the governing coalition, or sees him-or herself as transcending parties, a president's willingness to more actively engage in governing may increase. Notably in the above examples, in Slovakia, the president was not directly elected, yet still was able to force the prime minister out of office by identifying with a broader public discontent and considering himself above parties. Similarly, the relationship between Hungarian prime minister Jozsef Antall and president Arpád Göncz was characterized by bitter conflicts (Baylis 1996), which were potentially escalated by their different party affiliations, and this was despite the fact that the president did not have a direct popular mandate. Indeed, the level of Göncz's activism decreased considerably after his original party entered the governing coalition (O'Neil 1997). Czech president Vaclav Havel's influence and activism correspond also to the fluctuation in the strength of parties and consequently the parliament. Havel had much greater influence in determining the composition of government, setting the policy agenda, and influencing policy debate immediately after the fall of communism than later when parliament had strengthened and became better organized (Wolchik 1997).
To summarize, a president who faces hostile political forces in government and parliament has a greater incentive to become active in order to pursue his or her policy objectives. However, even such a highly motivated president remains constrained by the institutional limits of the regime. Presidential ambitions are more likely to facilitate activism and conflict when other policymaking institutions are weak and unable to counter presidential independence. Importantly, this argument applies regardless of the mechanism used for selecting the president, and thus effectively undermines the validity of the argument that popular legitimacy maps directly into presidential activism. Empirical tests provided here and in subsequent chapters contrast the alternative explanations-a technique that is more rigorous than simply rejecting the null hypothesis of either proposition.
Empirical Analysis of Presidential Activism: Government Formation
Having presented two rival arguments explaining presidential activism, the obvious question is which of these explanations is empirically valid.
There are several different ways that the empirical validity of these theoretical claims can be evaluated. None of the methods alone is perfect, but the combination of different methods will give a more complete picture of presidents in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. I begin to analyze the question of presidential activism by conducting relevant statistical tests, and continue with more in-depth analysis in subsequent chapters.
The first problem confronting quantitative analysis is determining how to measure presidential activism (i.e., the "actual" as opposed to constitutional power of the president). First, not all presidents possess similar powers. Consider the veto power. In theory, comparing the frequency of presidential vetoes would be a valid indicator of presidential activism since some presidents almost never veto laws, even if they have the formal power to do so, while others use vetoes frequently. However, this measurement does not capture presidential activism where the president has no formal veto power. Not only would excluding presidents without veto powers bias the sample but also within the remaining sample, the meaning of a veto can differ across countries. For example, a veto that is difficult to override because it requires mustering parliamentary supermajorities is a more powerful tool for activism than those that can be overridden by a simple majority. Practical problems with this measure should also not be overlooked; the required information on presidential vetoes is simply not available.
Moreover, concentrating on a single aspect of power, such as the presidential veto, runs into other difficulties. For example, a president may choose to be active in one specific policy area even though he or she possesses more powers. Finnish presidents, especially Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, have been very active in foreign policy, while in internal politics, the power of the president has been negligible. Still, Kekkonen has been considered an active president by most accounts. Considering only presidents' involvement in domestic politics would result in the misleading conclusion that the president has been inactive, while overall, he actually has exercised considerable influence. The measurement problem is thus nontrivial and can only be overcome by combining methods that allow for a consideration of various different kinds of powers. Lack of a research tradition and established measures requires one to be rather creative in developing appropriate indicators for quantitative analyses.
While the use of veto powers or informal influence over policymaking are difficult to quantify and compare, presidents' role in government formation processes is easier to standardize. The formation of government including the appointment of cabinet ministers is also one of the most important personnel decisions in parliamentary systems (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006) . Furthermore, this is one area where most presidents possess at least some powers and where case studies have documented the interference of even the least powerful presidents (Elgie 1999a; Taras 1997) . Actively exercising these appointment powers can easily lead to a conflict between the president and the prime minister.
Recent studies have argued that presidential power in the cabinet formation process is manifested in the extent of nonpartisan cabinet members ( . The assumption is that the prime minister (and his or her parliamentary coalition partners) always prefers partisan members of government. However, presidents, as the argument goes, often see their role as being above party politics, to function as the representative of the nation and of a coalition of preferences. Since presidents want to extend their appeal beyond their party (if they are partisan at all), they may be inclined to promote cabinet members who are independent of party politics (see also Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). The constitutional nomination powers of presidents can, of course, vary. But it is not only the actual nominal institutional tools that presidents can use, such as a veto, to exercise their power. Indeed, the share of nonpartisan cabinet members would also capture more subtle powers of presidents-those that account for their actual powers, which may include persuasion or the influence of cabinet formation via public opinion. In essence, since prime ministers always prefer partisans, the share of nonpartisan cabinet members is a possible indicator of presidential informal or "actual" powers. This intuition is supported by the evidence that technical cabinet members are rare in pure parliamentary systems (Almeida and Cho 2003), 4 but presidential cabinets, on the other hand, frequently include nonpartisan ministers (Amorim Neto 1998).
Cases and Measures
Using the share of nonpartisan cabinet appointments as the dependent variable, the analysis will compare the explanatory power of the mode of election and political opportunity framework in accounting for differences in presidential activism. The analysis relies on Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) , that studies the effect of presidential constitutional powers on the incidents of nonpartisan cabinet appointments. Unfortunately, the limited availability of information on key variables included in this analysis restricts the tests to 24 countries listed in the first column of Table 2 .1. The sample used in this chapter includes countries from both Eastern and Western Europe-regions containing most of the relevant countries. Combining countries from two regions allows for variance in the level of democratic and economic development and increases the heterogeneity of the sample. Still, these cases do not constitute a random sample of the universe and certain cultural similarity between the European cases may still bias the results. The unit of analysis is a cabinet and the data include every cabinet formed between 1990 and 2006. This extends the Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) dataset by six years and includes a total of 173 cabinets. A new cabinet was counted whenever one of the following conditions was met:
(1) the prime minister changed, (2) parliamentary elections were held, and (3) party membership of the cabinet changed (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). For each cabinet, I recorded the total number of cabinet members and the number of those members who did not belong to any political party. Technical caretaker cabinets were not included because these represent temporary arrangements and their formation is less likely to involve political bargaining.
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The measurement of the mode of election-one of the main explanatory variables-is straightforward. It is coded "1" if the president is elected directly by the people and "0" otherwise. Table 2 .1 classifies the countries included in this analysis according to whether they use direct or indirect presidential elections. About half the countries included use popular elections for the head of state. Two countries have switched their mode of election. In Bulgaria the first president was elected indirectly, but they have held direct elections since 1992. Slovakia switched from indirect elections to direct elections in 1999. The same table also reports the averages of the dependent variable: the share of nonpartisan cabinet members per country. The relationship between this variable and the mode of election is not immediately clear. On the one hand, the two countries with the highest average share of nonpartisan ministers-Bulgaria and Polanduse direct elections. On the other hand, three of the five countries with no instances of technical cabinet members-Iceland, Ireland, and Slovakiaalso use direct elections.
Political opportunity framework consists of several different factors including partisan opposition between the president and the government, and the strength of the government and the parliament. The former is measured by a dummy variable coded "1" if a given cabinet did not 5 Including such cases would also bias the results. Consider, for example, the effect of cabinet fragmentation on the share of nonpartisan cabinet members. In the case of a technical caretaker cabinet, this share is going to be very high-most likely 100%. At the same time, cabinet fragmentation will be zero, because there are no parties in cabinet. Having several such cabinets in the dataset would lead to the erroneous conclusion that low levels of cabinet fragmentation are associated with a high share of nonpartisans in cabinet, that is, a high level of presidential activism. include the presidential party and "0" otherwise. If the president was nonpartisan while the cabinet was partisan, then there is also partisan opposition. This follows the theoretical argument above that nonpartisan presidents acting upon their self-interest or a broader public interest are likely to come into conflict with the premier of any partisan affiliation. The fourth column in Table 2 .1 provides information about the average frequency of partisan opposition between the cabinet and the president. On average, it seems that cohabitation is more common in the case of directly elected presidents: about 49 percent of all cabinets in systems with directly elected presidents do not include president's party, while in the case of indirectly elected presidents this share is only 37 percent. At the same time, the two cases with no instances of opposition use direct elections while the country with the highest frequency of cohabitation as defined here-Hungary-uses indirect presidential elections. Overall, these cases exhibit considerable variance on the frequency of partisan opposition.
The strength of other institutions is measured by several indicators. As previously discussed, the strength of the parliament and cabinet is reflected by their level of fragmentation. I have included both a measure of legislative and cabinet fragmentation in the analysis. The former is captured by the effective number of parliamentary parties, which is a standard indicator of legislative fragmentation (Cox 1997; Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Lijphart 1999; Taagepera and Shugart 1989) . Cabinet fragmentation is measured by the number of parties in government (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). Additionally, I have included a separate dummy variable for minority governments (i.e., those controlling less than 50 percent of the seats in the lower house). Prime ministers heading such cabinets are in the weakest bargaining position in the government formation process compared to any other type of cabinet.
Country averages of all of these variables are reported in the last columns of Table 2.1. On average, Italian cabinets tend to be the most fragmented, but many of the East European countries come close. Albania, Romania, and Slovakia have had an average of at least four parties in government. The least fragmented cabinets are in countries with smaller party systems and more disproportional electoral systems. For example, Malta and Greece have only had single-party cabinets throughout the time considered here, and Portuguese cabinets included two parties only once. There is also considerable cross-country variation in the effective number of legislative parties. Finally, minority governments are not typically frequent, although important exceptions exist. The share is high for Bulgaria and Slovakia during the time when these countries had indirect presidential elections. In the case of Bulgaria, the share appears inflated because there were only two cabinets during that time and one of them happened to have minority status. Slovakia had four different cabinets during the time when presidential elections were indirect, and two of these cabinets were minority governments. Other Eastern European countries, such as Romania and Poland, have minority cabinets frequently, but such cabinets are also frequent outside the postcommunist region, such as in Turkey and Portugal. Thus, minority government is not peculiar to postcommunist democracies.
The extent to which presidents can exercise activism depends on their constitutional prerogatives. Some presidents are simply afforded more constitutional power than others and that may have an important impact on the extent of their influence over the government formation process. Several researchers have tried to construct cross-national indices of presidential power by noting the existence of various possible powers of the heads of state. These lists of potential powers, because they attempt to be comprehensive, can become very long and redundant. For example, Duverger (1978) lists 14 presidential powers, Lucky (1993 /1994 ) measures 28, and Hellman (1996 and Frye (1997) identify 27 different powers. Many of the individually listed prerogatives are simply appointment powers to different offices and counting them separately may unnecessarily overstate the extent of presidential power.
Others have attempted to follow a more parsimonious coding scheme. For example, Siaroff (2003) lists nine different powers of presidents. These include (1) popular election, (2) concurrent election of president and legislature, (3) discretionary appointment powers, (4) chairing of cabinet meetings, (5) veto, (6) long-term emergency and/or decree powers, (7) central role in foreign policy, (8) central role in government formation, and (9) ability to dissolve the legislature. Each of these indicators is coded as a dummy variable and an additive index with a maximum of "9" and minimum of "0" is composed. The data are also available for each indicator separately, which makes it possible to exclude indicators. For the purposes of the current study, the first indicator should be excluded because the concept of direct elections is independently relevant to my analysis, and therefore cannot be conflated with presidential power. Because of its broad geographic coverage, Siaroff's index is gaining popularity in crossnational studies (Samuels 2004; Tavits 2007b) .
Another common indicator of presidential powers is the index originally provided by Shugart and Carey (1992) and modified by Metcalf (2000) . This index classifies presidential prerogatives into legislative and non-legislative powers. The former refers to presidential power in the legislative process that is provided for in the constitution. It includes the following powers: (1) package veto, (2) partial veto, (3) decree powers, (4) budgetary powers, (5) executive introduction of legislation in reserved policy areas, (6) proposal of referendum powers, and (7) judicial review. The non-legislative powers have to do with presidential prerogatives in the process of government formation and include more specifically the following powers: (1) cabinet formation, (2) cabinet dismissal, (3) censure, and (4) dissolution of assembly. Each indicator is recorded on a scale from "0" to "4", from which an additive index is composed. This list of powers is less comprehensive than some of the other indices noted above, but their advantage is that they were chosen because the theoretical literature on regime types suggests that these powers are important (Metcalf 2000). The power index based on the conceptualization by Shugart and Carey (1992) The question remains as to which of these indices should be used for current purposes. Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) only control for the legislative power index provided by Metcalf. They argue that presidential bargaining power in the process of government formation depends on his or her ability to affect parliamentary decisions (i.e., on the legislative powers). However, actual presidential power over this process should be influenced more by his or her constitutional prerogatives with regard to government formation. Given that there is no clear preference in the previous literature over which power index to use, and for the sake of testing the robustness of the results, I present four alternative analyses below: (1) controlling for presidential legislative powers according to Metcalf, (2) controlling for non-legislative powers according to Metcalf, (3) controlling for Metcalf's combined index, and (4) controlling for Siaroff's index of presidential powers, excluding the indicator of direct elections. The Siaroff index is available for all countries in the analysis. No single source provides Metcalf scores for all countries. I have relied on scores provided in Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) , Frye, Hellman, and Tucker (n.d.), Metcalf (2000) , and Shugart and Carey (1992). For countries not included in these sources, I created the indices using information obtained from those countries' constitutions.
As the analysis includes both established Western European democracies and newly democratized postcommunist countries in Europe, I have also included an additional control for the age of democracy at the time each cabinet was formed. Such a control is necessary because opting for nonpartisan cabinet members may be more likely in less stable and unconsolidated democracies. The variable is measured using the natural logarithm of democratic age in years. For old democracies, 1946 is used as the baseline (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006).
Analysis, Results, and Interpretation
The dependent variable-the share of nonpartisan ministers-is reported as a proportion (i.e., bounded by zero and one). This makes an extendedbeta binomial (EBB) model preferable to an ordinary least squares (OLS) model because the latter leads to inefficient estimates for this type of data (Palmquist 1999 ). An EBB model is essentially a logit (or probit) model for grouped binomial data but unlike these models, an EBB model relaxes the assumptions of independence and identical distribution of the binary variables making up the groups. This makes it more generally applicable than the binomial estimations of grouped data. In order to run an EBB estimation, one needs to include the number of nonpartisan cabinet members on the left-hand side of the equation and the total number of cabinet positions on the right-hand side. Given that the data are pooled across 23 countries, I will also include country fixed effects (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006). The coefficients for the fixed effects are not presented because these are not of substantive interest here. Excluding the country fixed effects does not change the substantive results, although doing so improves the significance levels of some of the institutional variables.
While the EBB model takes into account the nature of the dependent variable, this model does not control for the pooled nature of the datathe threats of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity present in the country panels. I therefore reestimated all four models using the OLS regression analysis with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) and a natural logarithm of the dependent variable. The results of these alternative estimations were not significantly different from the ones presented below, so I have not reported them here. However, note that the findings are robust across different estimation techniques. Table 2 .2 reports the results of several different EBB estimations using the alternative measures of presidential constitutional powers, and the findings are consistent across models. First, there is no evidence that the mode of election influences presidential activism. The variable remains insignificant in all four models. The same is true when OLS models with panel corrected standard errors were used. Directly elected presidents are not more likely than their indirectly elected counterparts to actively engage in government formation processes.
The political opportunity framework explanation finds more support. First, partisan opposition is a strong and consistent predictor of presidential activism. The share of nonpartisan cabinet members is significantly higher when a president's party is not represented in the governing coalition. This includes situations when the president is nonpartisan and acts according to his or her self-interests rather than partisan interests. Such a president is likely to be politically opposed to a government of any ideological composition. This result corroborates the findings of previous studies that have looked at the effect of cohabitation in the context of semi-presidentialism (i.e., directly elected presidents only) (Protsyk 2005a (Protsyk , 2006 .
Similarly, weak cabinets increase "actual" presidential powers: the share of nonpartisan cabinet members is significantly higher in the case of minority, as opposed to majority, cabinets. This supports the expectation that the weakness of other institutions significantly increases presidential activism. This result is also strong and consistent across models. As above, the importance of minority governments for presidential activism and intra-executive conflict has been established in the context of directly elected presidents (Protsyk 2005a (Protsyk , 2006 . The current study extends the findings to countries with indirectly elected presidents. The similar findings between the current study and studies focusing exclusively on directly elected presidents highlight the importance of not differentiating between regimes based solely on the mode of election of the head of state. Countries where presidents coexist with prime ministers seem to be more alike than different; the constraints on governing are very similar regardless of how the president is selected, and the research tradition should accommodate that.
The two other variables capturing the weakness of other institutionslegislative and cabinet fragmentation-provide mixed results. Cabinet fragmentation is statistically significant at the 10 percent level using a one-tailed test. Furthermore, the coefficient of this variable has the correct sign: the higher the level of cabinet fragmentation (i.e., the weaker the cabinet), the more likely the president is to exercise his or her power. Since this effect is again consistent across all four models, it is possible to conclude that this variable is at least weakly related to presidential activism in government formation. The more fragmented the cabinet, the more difficult it is for this institution to block presidential activism, which results in presidents being more influential in government formation processes, as expected. The variable capturing legislative fragmentation is weakly statistically significant only in two of the four models: Models 1 and 3. Yet even in these models, the coefficient for this variable has the wrong sign: Legislative fragmentation is negatively related to presidential activism. Since this relationship, however, is not robust and not consistent across models, the effect of this variable remains undetermined. Furthermore, the variable remained consistently insignificant in the alternative estimations performed (i.e., the ones using OLS models with panel corrected standard errors). To a certain extent, legislative fragmentation is already reflected in the measure of cabinet fragmentation, which may also account for the inconsistent results concerning this variable. The bivariate correlation coefficient between these variables is 0.45, although including both variables in the same model does not increase multicollinearity to a level of concern, as evidenced by variance inflation factors that are less than 1.5 for all variables. The different indices accounting for presidential powers also appear significant. This should not be surprising because the extent of these powers provides the framework within which presidents can exercise any activism. As hypothesized, the strongest effect is produced by the presidential non-legislative powers (i.e., their constitutional prerogatives in cabinet formation). The more prerogatives presidents have in this process, the stronger their actual activism and impact. In a way, these 6 The results do not change when cabinet fragmentation is dropped from the models. However, legislative fragmentation becomes positively and weakly statistically significant when both cabinet fragmentation and the country dummies are dropped. In order to better account for the possible interrelationships between the different variables measuring political opportunity framework, one could estimate a path model where presidential activism is a latent variable influenced by the variables measuring political opportunities, and in turn, together with controls, influences the share of nonpartisan cabinet members. Building an elaborate causal model is beyond the scope and purpose of this study. The results of a preliminary estimation of a path model were substantively very similar to the results presented in Table 2 .2. The only noteworthy addition was the positive indirect effect of legislative fragmentation on presidential activism via cabinet fragmentation. No other indirect effects were significantly different from zero. This is not surprising given that the intercorrelations between the political opportunity variables (with the exception of that between legislative and cabinet fragmentation) are relatively small, with the largest reaching only 0.19. constitutional powers are the most important aspect of the opportunity structure, which conditions presidential activism. These powers most directly provide or restrict the opportunities presidents have to exercise influence.
Studies of countries with directly elected presidents (classified as semipresidential regimes) have noted the importance of constitutional powers of the president for the functioning of the regime. Shugart and Carey (1992) , for example, differentiate between a president-parliamentary system and a premier-presidential system (see also Elgie and Moestrup 2008b; Protsyk 2006) . The former refers to a regime where a popularly elected president has constitutional powers to nominate or appoint and to dismiss cabinet. The latter, on the other hand, is a regime where a popularly elected president does not have the power to dismiss the prime minister or individual ministers. Presidents in the latter type are restricted in what powers they may exercise, and therefore they are naturally less active than presidents in the former type if the measure of activism across the two regime types is the same. Not surprisingly, Protsyk (2006) has shown that intra-executive conflict is more muted in premier-presidential regimes than in president-parliamentary regimes. Similarly, Elgie and Moestrup (2008b) have shown that, potentially due to this lower level of conflict, the former types of regime are also more stable than the latter types. Going beyond directly elected presidents, a more recent study has corroborated the current finding about the importance of presidential (legislative) powers for his or her activism across both directly and indirectly elected presidents (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006) .
In general, the evidence so far is in favor of the theory of political opportunity framework. One might argue that the potential explanatory power of the mode of election was weakened because constitutional powers were included in the model. Yet such argument only underlines the lack of a significant independent effect of the mode of election on presidential activism. It is simply more likely that directly elected presidents are assigned more powers than indirectly elected presidents-a relationship tested below. Thus, once these powers are controlled for, the mode of election (i.e., any extra legitimacy gained from being directly elected) has no independent effect on the behavior of presidents in office.
In order to investigate more closely the relationship between constitutional powers and direct elections, Table 2 .3 presents the different presidential power scores by country and mode of election. I have also calculated the average score on each indicator for directly elected and indirectly elected presidents. The table is sorted by the mode of election, effect of this variable should not get confounded with the constitutional powers of the president-both theoretically and empirically, it is the latter rather than legitimacy derived from popular elections that defines the scope of presidential activities. This further reinforces the argument that if parliamentary regimes need to be further classified, it should not necessarily be done according to the mode of presidential election, but perhaps according to their constitutional powers, which define the limits of their political playing field.
In addition to the analyses presented in Table 2 .2, alternative estimations to check the robustness of the results were performed. The OLS estimations are already mentioned. I also estimated alternative EBB models including two additional variables: the level of electoral volatility and the incidence of economic recession. Both of these variables originate from Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) and neither appeared significant in the additional analyses. Including these variables also did not change the substantive findings of the analyses presented here. This allows concluding that the findings presented are robust and consistent. Overall, the balance sheet is in favor of the theory of political opportunity framework. Weak cabinets and partisan opposition between the president and the cabinet significantly increase presidential activism. The conventional wisdom concerning the mode of election, however, lacks any significant independent explanatory power.
Substantive effects are difficult to grasp from the EBB model. The coefficients reported in Table 2 .2 are essentially logit coefficients, and an understanding of the magnitude of different effects can be gained by converting these coefficients into odds ratios. The odds ratios for the statistically significant variables are provided in Table 2 .4. On average, the odds of having a nonpartisan cabinet member are two times higher when there is partisan opposition between the cabinet and president than in the case of no opposition. The odds of having a nonpartisan minister are also more than twice as high for minority governments as for majority cabinets. The magnitude of these effects is consistent across all models. The effect of cabinet fragmentation is somewhat weaker but still substantively significant: each additional coalition partner increases the odds of a nonpartisan cabinet member by about 1.12 times. Compared to single-party cabinets, a coalition of nine parties (the maximum value on this variable) increases the odds of having a nonpartisan cabinet member by about three times, while with a more common five-party cabinet by about twice. The effect of presidential constitutional powers depends on the index used. As hypothesized, the strongest effect is produced by non-legislative presidential powers (i.e., presidential powers in cabinet formation). The more power the constitution assigns to the president in cabinet formation, the greater the president's actual power. Indeed, increasing constitutional powers of the president by just one increases the odds of nonpartisan ministers 3.7 times. The effect of other power indices is weaker, but still considerable. When interpreting the substantive effect of these variables, their range needs to be taken into account as well.
Odds ratios provide the change in odds given one unit increase in the explanatory variable. The range of the Siaroff index is the smallest: from 0 to 6, which also explains its smallest odds ratio. The range of Metcalf's legislative powers is from 0 to 8, non-legislative powers range from 1 to 8, and the combined index from 2 to 13. An alternative way to get a substantive grasp of the effects is to consider the OLS estimates and calculate the expected values of the dependent variable-the expected share of nonpartisan cabinet members-when manipulating the independent variables of interest. I have calculated these based on Model 3. All other variables in the model are held constant at their mean (continuous variables) or median (categorical variables). Given that the dependent variable is a proportion, but the estimation technique assumes it to be continuous, the expected values are not very precise, but they give a general sense of the magnitude of the theoretically interesting effects. Table 2 .5 presents four different scenarios. The first three rows provide the expected share of nonpartisan presidents when each of the three statistically significant opportunity framework variables is at its minimum (second column) and maximum (third column). The last row presents the combined effect of these variables: the expected share of nonpartisan ministers when all three variables are at their minimum and maximum. The substantive effect of all three variables measuring the political opportunity framework is impressively strong. Consider two extreme scenarios: in situations with unified partisan control of the presidency and the cabinet and one-party majority governments, the expected share of nonpartisan cabinet members is very close to zero; in the other extreme, with maximum fragmentation of the cabinet (the maximum for this variable is 9), minority cabinet and cohabitation, the expected share of nonpartisan cabinet members increases to 22 percent. This effect seems substantively very large. However, the latter scenario, with nine parties in cabinet, is also rather unrealistic. A scenario where minority cabinet and cohabitation are combined with a more realistic level of cabinet fragmentation (i.e., a cabinet of four parties), the expected share of nonpartisan cabinet members is still sizeable: 4.1 percent. Considering the individual variables, the expected share of nonpartisan ministers increases from 0.16 percent under a minority government to 0.6 percent under majority cabinets; the expected share is also considerably higher under partisan opposition (0.8%) than under unified control of the executive (0.16%); in one-party cabinets, the expected share of nonpartisan ministers is only 0.08 percent increasing to 1.1 percent when the number of parties in cabinet is increased to its maximum value, that is, 9.
In sum, the evidence from the quantitative analysis of presidential activism in cabinet formation favors the political opportunity framework model. Presidents are more active and effective, as measured by the higher incidence of nonpartisan cabinet members, when they face a politically opposed and weak cabinet. The evidence in support of this conclusion is robust and consistent across different models and estimation techniques. At the same time, directly elected presidents are not significantly more active and effective in the government formation process. This contradicts the argument that popular legitimization itself induces more activism from presidents. It is not the legitimacy derived from direct elections but the opportunities and incentives generated by the institutional and political realities in which presidents operate once in office that matters for their level of activism.
Admittedly, the statistical analysis presented in this chapter remains a rather crude test of the determinants of presidential activism. The most significant concern is that the share of nonpartisan cabinet members is an imperfect measure of such activism. The next two chapters try to remedy this weakness by taking a closer look at the relationships outlined in this chapter. Case studies allow examining various other, more direct measures of presidential activism and providing alternative tests of both the argument stressing the importance of popular legitimization and the one prioritizing the political opportunity framework. They also permit illuminating the causal mechanisms behind these relationships-another task at which statistical analysis usually falls short.
